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SECRET SWISS BANK ACCOUNTS: USES, ABUSES,
AND ATTEMPTS AT CONTROL
I. INTRODUCTION
The secret numbered Swiss bank account tends to conjure up in the American
mind a place to which a South American dictator transfers his country's treasury
before relinquishing control, or the instrumentality through which some cloak
and dagger episode of international intrigue is financed. Although these aspects
of the secret Swiss account probably exist, there is another aspect of the secret
Swiss account that is more closely related to the everyday lives of a growing
number of United States citizens. This aspect is the rapidly expanding use of
secret foreign' accounts, and the anonymity they provide, by United States
citizens to evade tax anid securities laws, to hide the fruits of illegal transactions,
and in general, to conduct their financial affairs without fear that their activities
will be susceptible to scrutiny by United States law enforcement officials or
regulatory,agdncies. This shift of the Swiss account from something "distant
and romantie' to' its present status as relatively easily accessible can be traced
to several factors.1 Probably the most obvious are the increase in the number of
United States citizens traveling abroad and thes tablishment by foreign banks
of branches niin;i or United States cities.'and in nearby Nassau.2 The initial
deposit necessary to open a Swiss account is "nominal" and anyone determined
to acquire such an account has little difficulty doingso.3 In any event, it is clear
that the Swiss banking business is growing at a prodigious rate.4 Although the
banks of several foreign nations provide the type of secret account that facilitates
criminal conduct,5 those of Switzerland have received by far the most attention.
This is readily understandable, since Swiss financial institutions are clearly the
best established and most reliable of any of those involved and therefore the
most attactive. 6 With the growing awareness of law enforcement and regulatory
1. Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 10 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 15073].
2. Hearings on the Legal and Economic Impact of Foreign Banking Procedures on the
United States Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1968) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
3. Estimates as to the amount necessary have been as low as $50. Hearings on S. 3678
and H.R. 15073 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
See also House Hearings, supra note 2, at 11.
4. "[Tlhe Swiss banks once again recorded a considerable increase in business. Between
the end of November, 1968, and the end of November, 1969, the grand total of the assets of
the 72 banks comprised in the monthly statistics of the National Bank rose . . . 20 per cent
as against 17 per cent for the previous twelve months." 1969 Swiss Bank Corp. Ann. Rep.
16.
5. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 1, at 8. "Panama, Liechtenstein, the Bahamas,
Luxembourg, West Germany and other countries have enacted laws which in one degree or
another are somewhat from a secrecy standpoint more strict than American laws." Id.
6. T. Fehrenbach, The Gnomes of Zurich 65 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Febrenbach].
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officials that secret foreign accounts can effectively be used by violators to avoid
detection or to make damaging evidence impossible to obtain, congressional
action was inevitable. Congressman Patman,T Chairman of the House Committee
on Banking and Currency, took the first step. He is well-known for his scrutiny
of the American banking industry. American banks, along with other domestic
"financial institutions," s are the primary target of legislation recently enacted
to cope with this conduct. The Patman Committee Bill,0 passed by the House
of Representatives on May 26, 1970, and its counterpart passed by the Senate' 0
on September 18, 1970, both attempt to curtail the usefulness of secret foreign
accounts by requiring American banks and financial institutions to keep records
and make reports concerning various financial transactions, so that the guilty
can be prosecuted on evidence existing in the United States." The President
signed the bill on October 26, 1970.12
It is the purpose of this comment to examine the conditions that prevail in
Switzerland with regard to bank secrecy and to illustrate a few sophisticated
schemes that have been uncovered whereby United States statutes and regula-
tions have been circumvented. Furthermore, it will examine the recent attempts
by the federal government to remedy the enforcement difficulties through a
treaty with Switzerland and through federal legislation.
II. SWITZ=nAND
A. Background
Any discussion of the use of Swiss banks and their secrecy features by United
States citizens must begin with the realization that, although the existence of the
system presents a problem for the United States, it cannot be viewed as a
nefarious arrangement designed by the Swiss to facilitate the circumvention,
for profit, of our regulations. The Swiss regard for the right to privacy in one's
personal affairs, and particularly in one's financial affairs, reaches back into the
traditions of the Middle Ages and follows a logical course of development up
to the point where today that right to privacy is protected against violation by a
criminal statute.' 3 "The main reason why Swiss lav protects bank secrecy so
strictly is that the Swiss consider the secrecy of their private affairs as an aspect
"Unlike the Swiss, the other exotic banks did not stem from a national consensus, nor did
they have an honest, hard-working, stable society behind them. Most of them have always
been on shaky ground, and the customers know it." Id.
7. Democrat of Texas.
8. E.g., securities or commodities brokers or dealers, investment bankers, currency ex-
changes, issuers of traveler's checks and money orders, operators of credit card systems, insur-
ance companies, finance companies, and pawnbrokers. H.R. 15073, 91st Cong., 2d be!ss. § 203 (e)
(1970).
9. H.R. 15073, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
10. S. 3678, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
11. See H.R. 15073, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. 3678, 91st Cong., 2d Sere. (1970).
12. 39 U.S.L.W. 92 (Nov. 10, 1970); N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1970. at 28, col. 1.
13. See Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, 5 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 128, 128-29 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy].
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of personal liberty which they wish to preserve."' 4 Of course, this desire for
personal privacy in financial affairs is not unique to the Swiss. In most nations,
including the United States, a person's dealings with his bank are generally
considered confidential.' 5 In fact, the recent trend in this country has been
marked by attempts to strengthen the citizen's right to privacy in his financial
affairs.'6 However, due to historical circumstances, the Swiss bank depositor's
right to secrecy is enforced by criminal"7 as well as civil sanctions.' 8
Although modern banking was not accepted in Switzerland until the mid-
nineteenth century,19 the Swiss banker's obligation of secrecy had its origin in
the beginnings of banking activity in the sixteenth century.20 The fact that the
secret aspects of banking tradition were so elevated by the Swiss is consistent
with their development as a nation. In the loose cantonal federation of Switzer-
land there was no such thing as national or public money. Once money was
issued the government retained no further control over it; private property in
Switzerland was strictly private.21 It was in this atmosphere that the Swiss bank-
ing industry developed. Swiss law recognized secrecy as a necessary but un-
written feature of the bank's relationship with its customers long before such
ideas were codified.2 2 Actually, most advanced nations had the same secrecy
provisions as the Swiss, 23 with one enormous exception-the Swiss courts applied
secrecy as a bar to the government itself.2 4 It was not until 1934 that the Swiss
codified the obligation and provided a criminal sanction for its violation. The
statute was enacted at that time because the Gestapo of Nazi Germany was
surreptitiously attempting to probe into the records of Swiss banks to see if cer-
tain "enemies of the state" were violating German law by removing their funds
14. Friedrich, The Anonymous Bank Account in Switzerland, 1962 3. Bus. L. (Eng.) 15,
18 [hereinafter cited as Friedrich].
15. See Note, Swiss Banks and the Avoidance of American Tax and Securities Laws: An
Assessment Based on Proposed Legislation, 3 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol, 94, 103 (1970) [herein-
after cited as Swiss Banks and Securities Laws], referring to recent cases and proposed fed-
eral legislation that emphasizes protection for the privacy of bank accounts in the United
States.
16. Id. at 103-04.
17. Article 47(b) of the Swiss Banking Law contains specific sanctions against certain
persons actually involved in the banking industry. 10 Bereinigte Sammlung der Bundesgesetze
und Verordnungen 1848-1947, at 337, 355 (Switz. 1951) [hereinafter cited as Swiss Banking
Law].
18. See Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 13, at 129-31 for other sections of
various Swiss statutes that protect one from invasion of his financial privacy by a person not
specifically covered by § 47(b).
19. Fehrenbach, supra note 6, at 32.
20. Mueller, The Swiss Banking Secret, 18 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 360, 361 (1969) [herein-
after cited as Mueller).
21. Fehrenbach, supra note 6, at 62-63.
22. See Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 13, at 128.
23. Fehrenbach, supra note 6, at 62-63.
24. Id.
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from the country and secreting them in the privacy of anonymous Swiss ac-
counts.25 The statute is translated as follows:
Anyone who in his capacity as an officer or employee of a bank, or as an auditor or
his employee, or as a member of the banking commission or as an officer or employee
of its bureau intentionally violates his duty to observe silence or his professional rule
of secrecy. or anyone who induces or attempts to induce a person to commit any such
offence, shall be liable to a fine of up to 20,000 francs or imprisonment for up to six
months, or both.
If the offender acted with negligence he shall be liable to a fine up to 10,000
francs. 26
B. The Present Situation
The Swiss secrecy statute applies to an account that is under the depositor's
actual name just as it does to one under a number or code name.2 T The secrecy
feature is present with every Swiss account. Code names and numbers were
designated to insure that only a few of the bank's highest officials would know
the true identity of the account holder and thus decrease the likelihood that an
identity would be ascertainable via correspondence handled by lower echelon
personnel.28
The duty of silence that obliges the Swiss banker to keep certain information
confidential is by no means absolute. As the agent of his client the Swiss banker
cannot normally divulge confidential information to third parties without the
client's consent.29 The banker, however, is not specifically privileged under Swiss
law to withhold testimony in civil or penal actions as are the attorney, clergyman
and physida 30 Since the obligation to maintain discretion "is of a private law
nature,", it has occasionally been overriden by "public law." 31
The policy of banking secrecy, then, is not absolute with respect to everyone
seeking information, but only to those who do so without the sanction of public
law and court order3 2 The principle underlying this policy is embodied in the
Swiss Penal Code which prohibits foreign judicial or administrative personnel
from conducting investigations in Switzerland and further prohibits foreign
individuals from interrogating witnesses without court permission.3
There are several instances where the Swiss have determined that the banker's
obligation of silence is outweighed by an overriding public interest in disclosure.3 4
Among these are situations in which Swiss authorities provide "foreign countries
25. Mueller, supra note 20, at 361. See also Note, Swiss Banks and Securities Law, supra
note 15, at 96.
26. Mueller, supra note 20, at 362.
27. Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 13, at 132. See also Friedrich, supra
note 14, at 20.
28. Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 13, at 132.
29. Mueller, supra note 20, at 362-63.
30. Id. at 361.
31. Id. at 366.
32. Note, Swiss Banks and Securities Laws, supra note 15, at 97.
33. Mueller, supra note 20, at 373.
34. These include both criminal proceedings and certain civil cases. See id. at 366-70.
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[with] extensive assistance for the prosecution of criminal acts but not for the
violation of simple administrative law."35 It is this distinction between criminal
law and administrative matters that leads to the heart of this frequently mis-
stated problem. It is not the bank secrecy statute in Switzerland that creates the
problem for United States law enforcement officials investigating tax and
securities crimes, but rather it is the Swiss attitude toward taxes and the fact
that they have no securities regulations comparable to ours.""
In Switzerland the income tax is a confidential administrative matter between
the taxpayer and the authorities.87 Tax evasion is not regarded as a crime under
the Swiss Penal Code.3 8 Normally "[Swiss] tax authorities may receive informa-
tion from a bank only with the consent of the taxpayer concerned . ...189
Therefore, the aforementioned disposition of the Swiss to cooperate with foreign
authorities in the prosecution of crimes4" is not present in tax evasion cases. The
Swiss, naturally enough, have consistently refused to undermine the highly
valued privacy of a person's financial affairs where the matter involved does not
fit within their definition of crime.4 1 In view of this situation it is not surprising
that the Swiss tax administration has always refused to answer inquiries by the
United States Internal Revenue Service for information on assets deposited
with banks in Switzerland.42 Similarly, a Swiss bank cannot be compelled to
35. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 372-73.
37. Id. at 371.
38. Id. at 372. The Swiss do, however, differentiate between tax evasion and tax fraud.
While the former is merely administrative, the latter can be the basis for criminal prose-
cution. Where the facts are such that the Swiss would consider it tax fraud a recent Swiss
Supreme Court decision has held that "federal tax authorities can supply information to
Washington on dealings with Swiss banks of a United States citizen suspected of a tax
fraud." Thus in those Swiss Cantons where banks are obliged to supply information on the
demand of Swiss tax authorities in connection with criminal proceedings for fraud, the
Internal Revenue Service will likewise be able to obtain this information. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4,
1971, at 9, col. 1.
39. Mueller, supra note 20, at 371.
40. Id. at 374-75.
41. Although they have acceded to the European Convention of April 20, 1959 con-
cerning legal assistance in criminal matters they have refused to give such assistance In cases
of "political, military and fiscal crimes." Id. at 374-75. This policy is also embodied in a
United States-Swiss Treaty. Convention with The Swiss Confederation For The Avoidance
Of Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes On Income, May 24, 1951, [1951J 2 U.S.T. 1751,
T.I.A.S. No. 2316 (effective Sept. 27, 1951). In Article XVI(1), the type of information the
parties agree to supply is limited strictly to that which is "necessary for carrying out the
provisions of the present Convention or for the prevention of fraud or the like in relation
to the taxes which are the subject of the present Convention." Id. at 1760, T.IA.S. No. 2316,
at 10. Article XVI(3) succinctly states the Swiss position on all matters of international
cooperation with regard to the prosecution of crimes: "In no case shall the provisions of this
Article be construed so as to impose . . . the obligation to carry out administrative measures
at variance with the regulations and practice of either contracting State . . . ." Id. at 1760-61,
T.I.A.S. No. 2316, at 11. Note, Swiss Banks and Securities Laws, supra note 15, at 98-99
points out the irony of the current criticism of the Swiss position in that the treaty "makes
the Swiss position on the investigation of tax evasion binding on the United States ... .
42. Mueller, supra note 20, at 376.
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give information concerning the true owner of shares and bonds which the bank
keeps in a nominee account. 43
II. ABusEs
Over the years numerous imaginative schemes have been developed to take
advantage of the idiosyncracies of the Swiss law with regard to taxes and secu-
rities and the banking secrecy statute.44 The very nature of these secret
transactions precludes a reliable account of their origins or an accurate
description of their development and proliferation.
As early as 1958, however, the New York Regional Office of the Internal
Revenue Service made an investigation into the use of secret Swiss accounts for
the purpose of tax evasion.45 Although a congressional investigation and a
tightening of United States laws were recommended, no effective action was
taken. The situation remained this way until December, 1968, when Representa-
tive Patman's committee launched an investigation. 47 During the course of these
and later hearings48 representatives of various federal institutions4 0 described
some of the schemes in which secret foreign accounts (usually Swiss) were
used as instrumentalities to facilitate the evasion or violation of United States
laws and regulations. The three main areas of abuse appear to be transactions
involving money that is the fruit of illicit conduct, 50 tax evasion,5 1 and securities
law avoidance.52
43. Id.
44. In his remarks to the House as he introduced H.R. 15073, Representative Patman
expressed the view that, "[t]he illegal use of these accounts is as varied as the various
schemes and conspiracies that the furtive, criminal imagination can devise?' 115 Cong. Rec.
2. H 11689 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1969).
45. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1969, at 62, cols. 7-8.
46., Id.
47. House Hearings, supra note 2.
48. Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 1.
49. E.g., Statement of Robert Morgenthau, United States Attorney, S.D.N.Y., House
Hearings, supra note 2, at 11; statement of Irving M. Pollack, SEC, id. at 17; statement and
testimony of Randolph W. Thrower, IRS, Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 1, at 64;
statement and testimony of Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Department of Justice, House Hearings,
supra note 2, at 5.
50. E.g., the sale of heroin, Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 1, at 25; bribes and kick-
backs to armed forces purchasing agents, id. at 128; theft of poverty program funds, id. at
31; fraudulent overcharging on defense contracts, id. at 158.
51. In this area abuses range from the simple "skimoff," where cash receipts are de-
posited in secret accounts before they are reported, to complex systems of double invoices
whereby a business "pays" money into the account of a foreign corporation which in reality
is an alter ego. Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 1, at 10-11. In what might be described
as adding insult to injury there have been instances where a taxpayer has claimed an interest
deduction on foreign "loans" that were actually withdrawals from his own secret account
and where a taxpayer claimed as a bad debt deduction the failure of a foreign corporation
to repay a loan when actually he owned the company and the "loan" was merely a payment
to his own account. Id. at 26.
52. Varied and sophisticated schemes have been uncovered in this field. A Swiss or other
foreign bank can act for its customer's account without divulging his identity. When the
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A United States prosecutor 3 related some instances in which he had been
faced with the problem of preparing a case involving transactions that lay be-
yond the reach of his investigatory powers because foreign banks were involved. 4
A review of a few of the cases handled by his office may be helpful to illustrate
the methods employed to take advantage of the present situation and the dif-
ficulties involved in unravelling the pieces of the complex arrangements.
The case of United States v. Kelly 5 involved the use by Americans of
"Liechtenstein trusts"5 6 and Swiss accounts to reap an enormous profit from
the sale of manipulated stock. Although each of the trusts involved had a
Swiss lawyer as its titular head, they were American owned. One American
promoter (a person with a criminal record who had been enjoined from trading
in his own name)57 purchased 750,000 shares of stock from an American com-
pany on credit at a nominal price (as low as $1 per share) in the name of a
Liechtenstein trust. At the time of purchase the trust had assets of $20.80. The
"trust" then sold the unregistered over-the-counter shares through American
brokerage houses at prices manipulated to $15 with the profits going into its
Swiss accounts. From his investment of $20.80 the American promotor realized
the incredible sum of over $4,000,0001 Each transaction between the Americans
and their Swiss conspirators had the benefit of maximum secrecy. The fraud
was exposed only when the individuals involved divulged its workings.58
United States v. Hayutin59 is a similar case which was successfully prosecuted
because insiders finally confessed. This case also involved unregistered stock
which was manipulated to an artificially high price. The shares involved were
delivered by corporate insiders to a foreign bank which subsequently sold them
to the American public through brokers with whom it had accounts. Another
aspect of this case illustrated the use of foreign branches of United States banks
for illegal purposes.60 Included as part of the plot was the illegal reimbursement
of certain American brokers who promoted the sale of the shares from the profits
bank acts no distinction can be made between those transactions which benefit ta U.S. citizen
or resident and those which do not. The advantage for a U.S. citizen or resident is obvious.
He may wheel and deal with no SEC or IRS scrutiny. See Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra
note 1, at 11-13. Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (19 U.S.C. §§ 78a
to ?8hh-1 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1970)) relating, for example, to the use
of manipulative or deceptive devices (17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1970)), or reports of short
swing sales by insiders (17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (1970)) are of little concern.
53. Robert Morgenthau, Jr., former United States Attorney, S.D.N.Y.
54. E.g., House Hearings, supra note 2, at 11-17; Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note
1, at 18-28.
55. 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966).
56. The tiny principality of Liechtenstein has very liberal legislation that allows an indi-
vidual to easily transform himself into an anonymous legal entity. For a brief explanation
of the details, see Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 1, at 366-67.
57. Id. at 20.
58. Id. at 21.
59. 398 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968).
60. Mueller, supra note 20, at 363, points out that United States banks In Switzerland
come under the secrecy law as fully as a Swiss domestic bank.
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reaped by the insiders. To escape detection these payments were made through
the Frankfurt branch of a large United States bank. The insiders deposited the
funds in an account at this branch and from there the moneys were sent to the
bank from which they were withdrawn and put to unlawful use.0'
A 1969 case involving the Arzi Bank of Zurich is unique in that it was the first
time a Swiss bank was forced to answer criminal charges in this country. The
charges involved violations by the bank of the Federal Reserve Board's margin
requirements62 through active solicitation of United States customers who were
allowed to trade on as little as 10% margin as opposed to the 70% minimum
then required by law.63 The bank pleaded guilty to the charge.0 4
While the use of such accounts to evade laws and regulations may not be
commonplace the problem is certainly not insignificant, Moreover, an accurate
estimate as to the number of such illegal transactions and the amount of money
involved is precluded by the very nature of the problem. It has been said that a
"'conservative' estimate of the total [U.S.] money in secret foreign accounts could
easily run into the hundreds of millions of dollars."00 Furthermore, the United
States sustained a balance of payments deficit of seven billion dollars in 1969 of
which 3.2 billion dollars are listed under the heading "errors and omissions."0 7
While there is no record of the final destination of this money, it must be as-
sumed that some portion of it found its way into foreign accounts cs and that the
anonymity afforded depositors resulted in the frustration of United States laws
or regulations.
IV. ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS
It is in the light of the Swiss attitude regarding fiscal crimesc0 and bank
secrecy and the apparently growing exploitation of this attitude by United States
61. Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 1, at 21.
62. For an explanation of how the old regulation operated and how it has been changed
see Swiss Banks and Securities Laws, supra note 15, at 100 n.45.
63. Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1968, at 10, col. 3.
64. See Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 1, at 23; House Hearings, supra note 2, at
13-14. Actively aiding the Bank in these activities were some of the employees of Coggeshall
& Hicks, a member firm of both the New York and American Stock Exchanges. Some of the
brokers involved had their own personal accounts with the bank through which they re-
ceived illegal credit. The firm reaped approximately $225,000 in commissions as a result of the
illegal trades. As a consequence the firm, its senior partner, the Swiss manager of its Geneva
office, and three former registered representatives were indicted and each pleaded guilty.
65. During his tenure, Morgenthau's office procured indictments against 75 persons and
referred dozens of cases to the IRS. However, he estimated that for every indkidual against
whom action was taken six more went untouched because of a lack of competent evidence
due partly to the difficulty of tracing transactions through foreign banks. Hearings on H.R.
15073, supra note 1, at 91.
66. Bus. Week, Feb. 28, 1970, at 100.
67. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1970, at 38, col 1.
68. Id.
69. Notes 37-43 supra and accompanying text.
1971]
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
citizens70 that the attempted solutions and the ensuing controversy over their
effectiveness have arisen.
A. The Treaty
Probably the most effective way to solve the problems raised, from an Ameri-
can point of view, would be by a treaty between the United States and Switzer-
land that would grant our law enforcement agencies access to the records of Swiss
financial institutions if such records were necessary as evidence in a criminal
prosecution. The likelihood of such a treaty has never been great since the
Swiss respect for fiscal privacy in matters they do not consider crimes (e.g.,
violation of United States tax and securities laws) is not likely to be com-
promised to alleviate an American problem.71 Moreover, beyond this point of
tradition, realism forces the recognition that Switzerland enjoys a high level of
prosperity which is attributable, in no small portion, to its internationally re-
spected banking industry.72 Any radical departure from the strict policy of fiscal
privacy could only be detrimental to the Swiss banking industry and the Swiss
economy.
Nevertheless, preliminary negotiations were begun to explore the possibility of
a treaty of cooperation. The initial meetings, held in Washington, D.C. in April
1969 and in Bern in June 1969, indicated that the Swiss adamantly maintained
the position that there could be no disclosure where the acts involved were not
crimes according to Swiss law.73 Efforts continued in Washington, D.C. and in
Bern in 1970 with no apparent result and it appeared that it would be some
time before it could be determined whether any agreement could be reached. 74
Some hope was raised in April 1970 by a statement to the effect that the Swiss
might possibly relent where known criminals were involved.7s
The suspense ended abruptly on August 17, 1970 when it was announced
that the United States and Switzerland had agreed on a draft legal aid treaty
under which the Swiss Government will help trace money hidden in Swiss banks
by agents of organized crime.7 6 Although the exact conditions of the treaty were
not disclosed it seems clear that its terms do not embody any significant de-
parture from the traditional Swiss position.77 Apparently the treaty will have the
effect of including "organized crime with international repercussions" in the
definition of crimes common to both countries. 78 If a person is indicted for a
crime included under this heading the Swiss Government will request a court
70. See notes 44-68 supra and accompanying text.
71. See Mueller, supra note 20, at 377.
72. Fehrenbach, supra note 6, at 19, points out that Switzerland has poor soil, a lack
of resources, and the "third or fourth highest standard of living in the world."
73. Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 1, at 15, 41; Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at
172.
74. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 172.
75. N.Y. Times, April 8, 1970, at 67, col. 5.
76. Id., Aug. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 8.
77. Id. at 8, col. 1.
78. Id.
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order on behalf of the United States to facilitate the examination of confidential
bank records. 79 The Swiss apparently feel that this type of criminal activity is
unique enough to require exceptional measures. In such cases Switzerland would
be ready to help in the prosecution of offenses involving taxes and banking opera-
tions.80
In the past the Swiss have provided this type of assistance where the offense
involved constituted a crime in both nations.8 ' Apparently the only change that
this treaty will bring is that now, in this one area of "organized crime with in-
ternational repercussions," the information gathered from the examination of
bank records may be used as evidence in tax evasion matters whereas in the
past access to such information was restricted to cases involving non-fiscal
crimes.
8 2
The usefulness of this treaty for United States law enforcement officials will
depend on how liberally the phrase "organized crime with international reper-
cussions" is interpreted. Statements made by the Swiss indicate that the con-
struction will be strict and therefore the organized crime provision will be ap-
plicable in a limited number of cases.8 3 For those areas of violation of tax and
securities law that cannot be classified under the organized crime standard the
treaty will have no effect.8 4 The only possible solution in these areas, by treaty,
would appear to lie in a renegotiation of the convention with Switzerland for the
avoidance of double taxation,8 5 so as to provide for Swiss cooperation. This
treaty is designed to spare the citizen of one state, who earns income in the other,
from the burden of paying tax on the income to both states. Such a renegotia-
tion does not appear to be likely in view of the traditional Swiss attitude.80
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. E.g., in a recent Swiss case, hailed by the United States press (N.Y. Times, March 3,
1970, at 16, coL 1; Wall St. J., March 2, 1970, at 9, col. 2), the Swiss Supreme Court con-
firmed a lower court ruling allowing the United States Department of Justice to examine
Swiss bank records and to produce them as evidence in a United States court. The defendants
were charged with defrauding the United States Navy on defense contracts and since fraud is
also a Swiss crime the financial records were produced. For further details see Swiss Banks
and Securities Laws, supra note 15, at 94-95.
82. The Swiss Court predicated its orders on the fact that the records would not be used
by the United States for "fiscal purposes." Id.
83. The Swiss negotiators stated that they "had made few concessions, and that the
draft treaty constituted virtually no change from Swiss laws on tax evasion and banking
secrecy.' N.Y. Times, supra note 76, at 8, col. 1.
84. Mr. Nussbaumer, head of the Swiss delegation, pointed out that "bank accounts of
-Americans would remain secret in all cases where evidence by the United States failed to
convince the Swiss authorities that the person involved was cooperating in organized
crime." Id.
85. Convention with The Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
with Respect to Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, [19S1] 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316;
see note 41 supra.
86. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
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B. Legislation
The difficulty inherent in negotiating a treaty that would be satisfactory to
United States law enforcement interests seeking information secreted in foreign
accounts caused the emphasis to be placed on the alternate route of federal
legislation. The basic thrust of the recent legislation is to impose sufficient
financial record-keeping and reporting requirements on those under United
States jurisdiction so as to make it unnecessary for investigators to seek informa-
tion protected by foreign laws.
1. Content and Aims
The recent legislation 87 contains three major provisions relevant to this
area. Title I, Financial Recordkeeping, amends the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act.88 The purpose of this amendment is to require the maintenance of appro-
priate types of records by insured banks in the United States where such records
"have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investiga-
tions or proceedings."8 9 Insured banks are thus required to maintain records,
as prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, of the identity of account
holders and persons authorized to act with respect to their accounts.0o Further-
more they are obliged to keep a record of checks received for deposit or
collection 9l and photocopies of checks drawn on them or presented for pay-
ment.92 The Secretary is also given discretion to extend any or all of these
record-keeping requirements to certain other uninsured financial institutions.
Domestic transactions, regardless of amount, come under these record-keeping
requirements. 94 Provisions are made to give the Secretary injunctive powers9 r
and to provide civil9 and criminal penalties.97 Thus, the primary goal of
this title is to assure the maintenance9 8 of records reflecting the transfer of
87. Pub. L. No. 91-508, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5127-53 (Nov. 20, 1970). In Its
final form the law also contains titles added by the Senate relating to credit cards and
consumer credit reporting. Id. §§ 501-622, at 5140-53.
88. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970).
89. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 101, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5127-28 (Nov. 20, 1970),
amending Fed. Deposit Ins. Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V,
1970).
90. Id., amending 18 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970).
91. Id., amending 18 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970).
92. Id., amending 18 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3) (1964).
93. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 123(a), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News $130 (Nov. 20, 1970).
Among the institutions included are those in the business of issuing or redeeming checks,
money orders, traveler's checks or similar instruments otherwise than as an incident to
conduct of its own nonfinancial business, transferring funds or credits, operating a currency
exchange, operating a credit card system, or engaging in other functions as the Secretary
might specify by regulation. Id. § 123(b) at 5130.
94. The original House Bill (H.R. 15073, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(i) (1970)) exempted
transactions involving less than $500 from the proposed record-keeping requirements.
95. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 124, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5130 (Nov. 20, 1970).
96. Id. § 125.
97. Id. §§ 126-27, at 5130-31.
98. See Hearings on H.R. 15703, supra note 1, at 92, wherein Mr. Morgenthau alludes
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funds since these would be of great assistance in the detection of criminal ac-
tivity 99
Title II is entitled Reports of Currency and Foreign Transactions. Its stated
purposes are similar to those in Title POO and the regulatory'0 1 and exemptive'-
powers it grants to the Secretary are quite broad. It contains three major pro-
visions. The first concerns domestic currency transactions'0 3 and it requires re-
ports to be filed with the Secretary according to his direction as to "It]rans-
actions involving any domestic financial institution . . . if they involve the
payment, receipt, or transfer of United States currency, or, such other monetary
instruments ... ."104 The hope is that such reports will call attention to "[t]he
deposit and withdrawal of large amounts of currency or its equivalent (mone-
tary instruments) under unusual circumstances [which] may betray a criminal
activity."'0 5 The second provision requires reports of exports and imports of
monetary instruments'0 8 in and out of the United States in amounts exceeding
the statutory norm. 0 7 The idea behind this provision is to provide a legislative
weapon' 08 to combat those who "send money to foreign jurisdictions with
secrecy laws for the purpose of evading taxes and otherwise hiding assets."'0
The third provision, involving foreign transactions" 0 directs the Secretary to
require detailed records and reports from those who transact business or main-
tain any relationships with a foreign financial agency. The goal of this pro-
vision is to close the gaping loophole that has allowed widespread tax and
security law evasion to go unpunished because law enforcement officials were
often "delayed or totally frustrated when wrongdoers cloak[ed] their activities
in the shield of foreign financial secrecy.""' Title II also authorizes injunctive
relief ' 2 and civil"" and criminal" 4 penalties similar to those provided in
Title I.
Title I amends § 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934u r' to apply the
to the necessity of Title I "in view of the trend among some of our largest banks to dis-
continue their practice of photocopying these documents."
99. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1970) [Hereinafter cited as H.R.
Rep. No. 91-975].
100. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 202, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5131 (Nov. 20, 1970).
101. Id. § 204, at 5133.
102. Id. § 206, at 5133-34.
103. Id. §§ 221-23, at 5135-36.
104. Id. § 221, at 5135.
105. H.R_. Rep. No. 91-975, supra note 99, at 11.
106. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 231, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5136-37 (Nov. 20, 1970).
107. Reports must be made of such transactions involving more than $5,000 on any one
occasion. Id.
108. Unreported money could be forfeited. Id. § 232, at 5137.
109. H.R. Rep. No. 91-975, supra note 99, at 13.
110. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 208, US. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5134 (Nov. 20, 1970).
111. H.R. Rep. No. 91-975, supra note 99, at 12.
112. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 208, US. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5134 (Nov. 20, 1970).
113. Id. § 207, at 5134.
114. Id. §§ 209-10.
115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-1 (1964), as amended, 15 US.C. (Supp. V, 1970).
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margin requirements in securities transactions to borrowers who are either
United States persons n6 or who are either controlled, acting for, or acting in
conjunction with such persons, without regard to where the lender's place of
business is or where the transaction occurred.11 7 The ultimate intent in this
instance is to protect the stability of the economy in general and the securities
market in particular" 8 by regulating the amount of foreign credit that can be
extended for purchasing or carrying securities." 9
2. Reception
Predictably, reaction to the bill was not uniform. Although support for
the aims of the legislation has been widespread,' 20 there has been much contro-
versy as to whether these particular measures provide the best solution to the
problem. The hearings before the House' 21 provided a forum for spokesmen for
law enforcement interests to decry abuses of existing laws' 22 and to indicate
support of this legislation.1ss Opponents of the legislation made their stand
during the Senate hearings 124 in June 1970. During these hearings representa-
tives of the banking and investment communities voiced their opposition 20 and
proposed alternatives which they found more acceptable.
120
Opposition to the legislation was based on many diverse grounds. Fear was
expressed that the record-keeping obligations imposed would be unreasonably
burdensome since they would require large expenditures for records that would
be of dubious practical value.' 27 The dangers to the traditional right of Ameri-
can citizens to privacy in their financial affairs was pointed out, 128 as was the
potential danger to confidence abroad in the strength of the dollar 2 D and the
discouraging effects of this legislation on the willingness of foreign investors to
deal in United States securities. 30 It was further emphasized that the unusually
broad discretion given to the Secretary in his regulatory role should be limited
116. United States persons include: citizens or residents, a corporation organized or exist-
ing under the laws of any state, a domestic estate, or a trust in which one or more of the
foregoing persons has a beneficial interest in excess of fifty percent.
117. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 301, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5139-40 (Nov. 20, 1970),
amending 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1964).
118. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-975, supra note 99, at 24.
119. Id.
120. But then, who could publically oppose legislation that is described in the press as
designed to stop the affluent from using secret Swiss bank accounts to commit tax evasion,
stock frauds and other white collar crimes as in N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1970, at 17, col. 4.
121. Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 1.
122. E.g., Id. at 65-70, 175-80.
123. E.g., id. at 96.
124. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 186-92.
125. E.g., id. at 227-30, 285-88.
126. E.g., id. at 193-221.
127. E.g., id. at 236-38.
128. E.g., id. at 227-28.
129. E.g., id. at 187-88.
130. E.g., id. at 237.
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since the potential for oppressive regulation is great.131 Opponents of the bill
had little success, however, as the bill was reported out by the committee almost
unscathed. 132
The Treasury Department, which will be primarily responsible for the
administration of the legislation, outlined several proposals that it preferred as
alternatives.1 33 The Department's approach clearly distinguished domestic
from foreign transactions and concerning the latter a multifaceted program
was favored. Among the proposals were provisions requiring United States
taxpayers to indicate on their returns the existence of any foreign bank or
brokerage account'3 4 and giving the Secretary power to require American banks
and financial institutions to keep records of certain specific foreign trans-
actions. 135 Moreover, the Department would require persons importing or
exporting large amounts of United States currency or its equivalent to file
reports.136
With respect to domestic transactions, the proposals would authorize the
Secretary to require record-keeping by banks and financial institutions at
his discretion, rather than the mandatory approach of the statute. This is
based on the fact that as of now no adequate study has been made to determine
the kinds of records that will be useful.137 The Treasury Department proposed
that the Secretary be directed to continue to study the problem and issue regu-
lations consistent with his findings. In addition, it was urged that the Treasury
Currency Reports already required of financial institutions be expanded, as the
Secretary deemed useful.
V. CONCLUSION
If it is to have any real meaning, the current emphasis on "law and order"
as a valuable goal for our society must encompass "white collar" as well as
"street" crimes. The futility and hypocrisy of crusades against the latter to the
exclusion of the former are readily apparent. The widespread and apparently
ever-increasing use by United States residents and citizens of secret foreign
accounts to facilitate the commission of crimes and the avoidance of tax and
securities laws is a problem that demands immediate attention.
Any attempt to deal with the problem would be unrealistic if it did not
recognize that it is essentially an American problem that will only be effectively
met by a solution devised within the framework of the United States legal sys-
tem. At present treaties must be viewed as an inadequate vehicle for dealing
131. E.g., id. at 187-89.
132. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1970, at 17, col. 4.
133. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 172-86.
134. Id. at 173. This will be required in taxable years beginning on or after Jan. 1, 1970
irrespective of the legislation. Id.
135. E.g., foreign remittances transferring funds abroad, foreign checks transmitted
abroad for collection, large checks negotiated abroad drawn on United States banks and
large foreign credit card purchases by United States citizens or residents. Id.
136. Id. at 174.
137. Id. at 153.
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with the problem. The recently announced United States-Swiss draft legal aid
treaty indicates that any hope of the Swiss making a major reassessment of
their traditional secrecy position to facilitate United States law enforcement is
unrealistic. The other nations which have emulated the Swiss,188 with the goal of
reaping profits for their confidential services, probably would never cooperate to
any further extent than would the Swiss. Therefore, federal legislation directed
against these abuses is necessary and desirable.
The need for some type of legislation is not challenged. However, a balancing
of the potentially dangerous problems that could be created by the recent
legislation against the degree of certainty that it will be effective indicates that
Congress should have been more selective in its attempts to cope with the situ-
ation.
Any meaningful evaluation of the effects of the legislation, either for good or
ill, is difficult in view of the broad regulatory and exemptive powers given to
the Secretary of the Treasury. However, even the supporters of the legislation
admit the possibility that the Secretary could impose record-keeping and report-
ing requirements which would, at worst, create a substantial and harmful burden
on the free flow of legitimate international commerce or would, at best, result
in much valueless paperwork.130 It is also probable that a large percentage of
the records and reports that could be required would have little or no law
enforcement value. Law abiding institutions and citizens could be required to
keep voluminous records and make extensive reports which would be only
tangentially valuable in a relatively small number of criminal cases.
There is, inherent in the legislation, a danger of well intentioned overkill.
Masses of records and reports (along with the inherent cost of storage and re-
trieval) could be required even though their usefulness would probably be
slight in comparison to the burden imposed by compliance. A more targeted plan
such as that proposed by the Treasury would have been preferable. The Trea-
sury's flexible approach with its emphasis on those transactions most likely to
show the international movement of funds would effectively serve the needs of
law enforcement while at the same time not unduly burdening commercial inter-
course. It is hoped that even within the approach favored by Congress the
Treasury will use its discretionary and exemptive power to promulgate regula-
tions that will achieve such a balance.
138. See note 5 supra.
139. H.R. Rep. No. 91-975, supra note 99, at 13.
